In the wake of the deadly escape of four prisoners from the maximum-security unit of Her Majesty’s Prison in Fox Hill earlier this year, the prison’s internal investigation suggested that either through complicity or negligence, corrupt prison officers facilitated the escape.
Two men died in that breakout on January 17 ﾖ murder convict and escapee Neil Brown, who it appears was shot after he had been recaptured and was handcuffed on the prison bus, and Prison Officer Corporal Dion Bowles.
“There prevails within the prison a culture of corruption among a small percentage of staff who have evaded detection,” according to the prisonﾒs internal report obtained by The Bahama Journal.
“Considering the fact that inmates in the maximum security unit seldom leave this unit, it is safe to conclude that certain staff members contribute to this vexing problem of contraband, which caused the death of Cpl. Bowles.”
The prisonﾒs internal report told of the security lapses that made the escape possible.
As evidence of collusion, the report cited that “there was no staff on duty in the surveillance room on the night in question.”
Prison Superintendent Dr. Elliston Rahming told the Journal he would not comment on the reportﾒs findings, since it has not been officially released to the public.
According to Dr. Rahming, the report was completed on February 25 and forwarded to the Ministry of National Security the same day.
According to the report on the investigation into the breakout by a special Court of Inquiry composed of five senior prison officers, soon after the prisoners were recaptured one of the four escapees was found with a shank in his cell.
“Subsequent to the deadly escape and death of Cpl. Bowles officers were able during special searches to find an additional 25 cellular phones in prison cells,” the report stated, after revealing that 85 cell phones had been seized in 2005.
The report added “a search of the front dormitory in the maximum-security unit conducted three weeks after the escape revealed $900 in cash, a number of cellular phones and more shanks.”
A Journal source in the prison, referring to that sweep, noted, “we know that those particular inmates did not go out to bring (those items) in.”
“Staff have been bringing stuff into this facility for years,” the source said.
In fact, other Journal sources within the prison say there remains among prison officers a strong sense of frustration that relatively few changes have been made.
“It is obvious that this was a well-orchestrated plan, timely executed by inmates of cells C8 through C25 all acting in collusion,” the report said.
The report reiterated some of the evidence that came to light in the coronerﾒs inquest into the tragic affair.
The Court of Inquiry found, among other things, that the prisonﾒs Internal Affairs Department “must accept its share of the blame for failing to uncover this plot by the inmates.”
“With the discovery in recent times of large numbers of cellular phones, large sums of cash, make-shift weapons, and evidence of the deliberate refusal of exercise by certain inmatesﾅproves that the watchdog was evidently not alert to reading the possible signs of impending breaches,” the Court of Inquiry found.
Head of Internal Affairs at the prison, Neville Adderley, had not returned telephone calls by press time.
The Court of Inquiry also suggested that the director of security at the prison bore some of the blame as well.
“To cite one example, a search of Barry Parcoiﾒs cell on 29th December 2005 uncovered a piece of hacksaw blade, cellular phone and silver paint in his cell. This triggered no response from the relevant commanders,” the report said.
As evidence that there was a plot, the Court of Inquiry report cited the discovery that wires connected to surveillance cameras covering some of the cells housing inmates involved in the escape ﾖ Neil Brown, Barry Parcoi and Forrester Bowe ﾖ were sabotaged.
The report also noted that wires supplying power to the emergency standby lighting units were cut and that electrical circuits in the prison cells could be used to trip the electrical system.
Among the factors that facilitated the escape, according to the report, were the “inadequacy, carelessness (and) poor judgment of (prison) staff.”
Five officers were detailed to patrol the West Block under the overall charge of Principal Officer Gregory Rolle, although Sergeant Herman Major was the Duty Officer responsible for detailing.
Sgt. Major detailed Sgt. Stephen Sands, Cpl. Dennis Johnson, Cpl. Dion Bowles, Officer Kenneth Sweeting and Officer David Armbrister to the West Block, placing Sgt. Sands in charge.
The report noted that Cpl. Johnson complained of being sick only when he reported for duty in the west block, and was allowed to go to the officersﾒ lounge, where he remained until the siren went off. It appeared that he refused to answer at least one attempt to get him to report back to the West block.
“Cpl. Johnsonﾒs reluctance to return to the West leaves much room for speculation, if not suspicion,” the report said.
After noting other flaws in the handling of security on the West block, the report stated “the staff assigned to the Western Block on the night in question displayed total disregard for security.”
The report concludes that in the 37 years since a prison officer Clarke Armbrister lost his life at the hands of inmate Ezra Nairn in 1968, a fairly cordial climate has existed between officers and inmates.
“It would appear that officers, in a collective sense, operated over the last few months in a mode of complacency while the powder keg was on the verge of exploding. The signals were there, but the relevant commanders did not take the necessary action,” the report said.
“It is acknowledged that Cpl. Bowles made an innocent but costly error for which he paid, but had security been enforced on a consistent basis, this entire plan would not have succeeded.”
The “costly error” the report refers to happened when Cpl. Bowles was lured to the cells by Barry Parcoi, who asked Cpl. Bowles to obtain an item from inmate Davy Gibson, whose cell was around the corner.
“Without being accompanied by a fellow officer Cpl. Bowles ventured through C-Block into what was an entrapment and eventually an ambush,” the report said.
Dr. Rahming told the Journal on Friday that security at the prison is “an ongoing process.”
“Since January 17, we have significantly improved the surveillance capability of the prison,” he said.
He added that, “as long as the prison has been here it has had a very porous border ﾖ itﾒs only now that that is being corrected.”
Dr. Rahming observed that any inmate who is able to sit in his cell and think of a way to get out might successfully achieve that goal, but that inmate ought to have a big problem getting off the actual prison compound.
Dr. Rahmingﾒs observation jibed with the findings of the Court of Inquiry, which noted “razor wire or motion sensors should line the perimeter walls and the extremities of the roof because the escapees were able to mount the roof with relative ease.”
By: Quincy Parker, The Bahama Journal
